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JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE

JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL

FOLLOW ME!

Assisting

United States Government Organizations

Supporting Military Operations

Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Choppa, United States Army

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.

The Contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

Signature_____

15 MAY 2005

ABSTRACT

This study provides recommendations that are aimed at improving the integration of U.S. military and other U.S. governmental organizations during operations.

This study solicited U.S. uniformed military and U.S. other governmental agency representatives responses to multiple questions. The questions focused on identifying skills, knowledge levels, impressions, and perceptions from military and interagency participants. The responses were compared to common U.S. military competencies and characteristics. Finally, recommendations were derived from the responses and comparisons.

The thesis, that the skills, knowledge and attributes required by military and interagency leaders to integrate and synchronize United States governmental efforts in complex operations need further development. By identifying these characteristics and providing ways to develop them, our Nation will establish a foundation of trained and ready future leaders that are capable of overcoming any challenge.

The Department of Defense can lead this effort with initiatives in doctrinal, organizational, training, leader development, and material areas. These initiatives will build teamwork within our government and set the stage for other nation's integration.

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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION

As the United States leads an international coalition of nations in the Global War on Terrorism, interagency operations prove to be essential in achieving success. As this is written, soldiers from the United States Army are participating in counterinsurgency, stability and support efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. There are several services that are integrated with those of the United States Army (USA), including the United States Navy (USN), United States Marine Corps (USMC), United States Air Force (USAF), United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), Iraqi military, British military, Polish military, and Kurdish military. There are also several United States agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of State (DOS), National Security Agency (NSA), National Geospatial Agency (NGA), and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) supporting military operations.

All of these services and agencies are providing superb support. There have however, been some integration challenges and problems at the tactical and operational level. By understanding these military / interagency integration challenges, knowledge levels and skills required to resolve these challenges, can be identified. When both military and interagency organizations develop the knowledge and skills necessary to integrate their operations, future success will be ensured.

The tactical level integration mentioned above was conducted with little preparation or previous experience. The expertise that is required for confident and competent uniformed service leaders to operate in this complex environment is currently developed at minimum levels in only a couple of the joint military service educational

institutions. Joint and service professional education must integrate to compensate for this lack of interagency cooperation/coordination capability. This paper will recommend the topics that should be addressed in these institutions to improve interagency integration during military operations.

The Department of Defense must lead domestic and foreign integration efforts for future interagency ⬚cess. This evolution will require doctrinal, organizational, training, leader development, material, personnel, facility, and other initiatives to ensure fully integrated and effective change. By committing resources, our uniformed leaders will ⬚e this governmental transformation both here in the United States and abroad. By leveraging the competencies and expertise of the various United States governmental organizations, our interagency team can effectively meet any future threats and solve most foreign problems prior to the committal of decisive military force.

There are several skills, knowledge and attributes required by interagency leaders to integrate and synchronize United States governmental efforts in complex operations. By identifying these characteristics and providing ways to develop them, our Nation will establish a foundation of trained and ready future leaders that are capable of overcoming any challenge. The President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense stated the importance of developing our capability to successfully complete interagency operations in both the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy. The Transformation Plans of our uniformed services and our Department of Defense includes developing interagency competencies.

There have been several initiatives at the United States national level to integrate our various Departments and agencies. Several of these initiatives will require changes in

law, budget, policy, and time for coordination, integration, and implementation. From proposals for a Goldwater-Nichols II to establishing the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (OCRS) in the Department of State Department, the leaders of our nation are on the path to transition the way our nation solves problems. All five Regional Component Commands (RCC) and two of the functional combatant commands have established Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) to promote interagency integration at the Theater level. This leaves a void in integrating interagency efforts in subordinate joint organizational efforts (Joint Task Forces) at the operational and tactical level of military operations. By initiating and developing programs aimed at building interagency integration competencies in our uniformed services, we will build future leaders that are competent, confident and comfortable working with other United States governmental organizations. These programs can also be leveraged by the other Departments in our government until national level studies and programs provide programmed solutions.

Our uniformed services must lead interagency integration and build interagency capabilities until national programs are implemented is important to both our national security and building in our efforts to aid international stability. The future Joint Operational Environment (JOE) requires officers at the tactical, operational, and strategic level to be prepared to operate with interagency partners. As we look at the complexity of the United States current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we see foreign military and Para-military training, counter-terrorism, counterinsurgency, stability operations, security assistance, humanitarian assistance, nation building, support operations, and major infrastructure construction operations occurring simultaneously.

There are internal and external threats in both Iraq and Afghanistan that further complicate the environment. To succeed in these current operations as well as those in the future, we must take immediate action. Analysis of these immediate actions, along with other ongoing initiative can be leveraged to lead our future success. The theoretical implications of this thesis are that our interagency efforts will be coordinated, integrated and effective. The implications of these initiatives will provide a shared foundation upon which the leaders can implement other programs, policies, and procedures. This thesis will test several things. It will test the ability of the uniformed services to develop and integrate interagency initiatives. It will test senior military leader's ability to accept risk by committing resources in experimental programs. It will test the ability of military leaders at the tactical, operational and strategic levels to accept new ideas and demonstrate resolve in complex, joint operational environments. Finally, it will test the department of Defense leaders ability remain flexible while critically analyzing results.

The problem is that the Department of Defense does not have the expertise or the resources to accomplish all missions, tasks, and operations associated with future complex environments and threats. The United States will require integrating the competencies of all governmental departments and agencies to provide solutions and answers to these future problems. Military leaders and interagency initiatives will lead this effort.

SCOPE OF THESIS

Applicable joint military references will be examined used for interagency operations in support of military operations. Through a review of existing joint military

doctrine and the ongoing interagency initiatives involving military transformation, common joint and interagency leader competencies can be deduced. Interagency coordination with Department of Defense is conducted at the national, theater, and tactical level during crisis.   This coordination is conducted for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. The concerted effort to accomplish these objectives must begin with a foundation of skills and knowledge. These skills and knowledge require competencies.

questionnaire and interviews associated with this thesis will allow identification of the military / interagency competencies that were required in combat. Following identification of these competencies; we will produce recommended systemic changes in military functional applications that can be used to further our interagency transformation. Recommendations will provide tactics, methods and procedural solutions that further our ability to successfully integrate interagency operations in support of military operations.

As our United States military transformation continues, parallel efforts to transform the interagency process will continue at the strategic and operational level. This transformation is viewed by the defense community as a necessity and a logical progression to meet future threats. It is necessary to identify how the integration of interagency operations in support of military operations will affect all of the existing processes, systems and functions and will lead to an increased capability in future United States foreign relations.

Additionally, the skills, knowledge and attributes will be highlighted that are relevant to both military and interagency leaders. These skills, knowledge levels and

attributes are must be developed to succeed in increasingly complex environments against future foes. Finally, those functional applications (doctrinal, organizational, and leader development) that will assist in developing interagency skills, knowledge, and attributes necessary to pave the way to future success will be identified.

CHAPTER TWO – STUDY METHODOLOGY

The method used to derive study insights included a questionnaire and personal interviews. By analyzing the input from persons with past experience in conducting interagency operations in support of military operations, recommendations can be deduced for developing competency requirements for successful future interagency cooperation during conflict.

There are several expectations associated with this study. When military and interagency leaders determine that developing a select competency or competencies is required, they can use one or several of this study's recommendations. The military insights concerning interagency competencies can also be used to provide interagency members with a listing of expectations. Likewise, military leaders could review interagency expectations to focus future plans, operations, and training events. Interagency leaders can use the recommendations to update developmental programs and pre-deployment preparatory classes.

STUDY PARTICIPANTS EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENT

Questionnaires were sent to personnel of uniformed military and interagency organizations that have had experience with other organizations during combat operations in either Afghanistan or Iraq. An assumption associated with using this group is the personnel that have had experience in integrating interagency operations have employed the most up to date techniques and procedures. There were three methods used to identify participants. The participants were initially identified through contacting interagency organizations using the internet and through personal contacts. This method

produced less than ten percent (10%) of the participants. A second method used was by identifying participants using the institutional experience of liaisons that are assigned with interagency organizations. The final method used was identifying participants using personal contacts from past experiences.

Several of the interagency organizations expressed concern that the study was not sponsored by the Department of Defense or any of the uniformed services. Persons currently serving as liaisons to several of the interagency organizations were essential to providing interagency participants. The interagency participants served at the tactical and operational level in overseas locations and in organizations located within the United States.

The military participants in this study represented all four branches of the United States Military. The interagency participants in this study represented seven agencies, about ½ of the governmental departments and only a couple of agencies. Although only a small portion of the governmental organizations, they represent a large portion of those that habitually participate in support of military operations overseas.

QUESTIONNAIRE METHODOLOGY

One hundred questionnaires where sent to personnel in forty locations both in the United States, Europe, Korea, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Sixty questionnaires were sent to combat veterans at the platoon and above level. Forty (40) questionnaires were sent to United States government employees that had supported combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. These interagency persons represented the U.S. Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, US Agency for International Development, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Customs Agency, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. A

total of thirty eight (38) responses were returned. Of these, twenty eight (28) were from military members and ten (10) were from persons from other governmental agencies.

INTERVIEW METHODOLOGY

Fifty one (51) personal interviews were conducted with thirty one (31) military personnel and twenty (20) interagency personnel. The interviews were conducted in six locations across the United States including Washington D.C. (the Pentagon), Fort Bragg, Norfolk Naval Base, Fort Belvoir, Pope Air Force Base, and Fort Monroe and telephonically or via e-mail with Fort Lewis, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Sixteen (16) interviews were conducted telephonically. The results from the questionnaire were grouped into appropriate areas and then used to identify interagency characteristics that will most likely be required in future conflicts overseas.

SCOPE OF STUDY

The scope of this study is to determine ways to improve the integration of military and interagency organizations supporting a military operation. The terms of reference are listed in the section entitled, Definitions Applicable to this Thesis. The study solicits feedback from both military and interagency professionals and derives conclusions and recommendations based on the participants actual responses to questions. This study focus is designed to result in a listing of expectations, perceived integration challenges, required competencies, and areas which would provide the most comprehensive and effective return on future development and education initiatives. Although this study solicited responses from a relatively small group of individuals that had combat experience in military / interagency operations, their responses are assumed to be representative of both communities.

STUDY PARTICIPATION

One hundred fifty three (153) attempts were made to solicit responses and associated feedback to this surveys questions. The questions were presented to participants using both questionnaire and interview methods. There were thirty eight (38) responses to the one hundred (100) questionnaires that were sent to participants. There were fifty one (51) participants in personal interviews, from fifty three (53) that were coordinated. When the thirty eight (38) questionnaire responses are combined with the fifty one (51) interviews, eighty nine (89) total responses were recorded. Eighty nine (89) responses from one hundred fifty one (151) is a sixty percent (60%) responsorial rate. A statistically viable percentage of sixty percent (60%) was determined as the baseline for responses to continue this study.

Of the fifty one (51) personal interviews conducted, sixty one percent (61%) were conducted with military participants and thirty nine percent (39%) were conducted with interagency participants. There were sixteen (16) interviews of the fifty one (51) conducted using the telephone. This indicates that thirty one percent (31%) of the interviews were via phone. When the initial thirty eight responses to the questionnaire were combined with the fifty one responses to the personal interviews, the 60% participation goal was achieved. With one hundred and fifty three attempts to gather the information, eighty nine were successful. The eighty nine total responses to questionnaires and interviews were required to reach the responsorial goal of sixty (60%) percent.

DEFINITIONS APPLICABLE TO THIS THESIS

There are several definitions that provide a foundation for review of interagency personal characteristics.

1. Behavior: defined as an action taken by an individual in pursuit of a task (s).

2. Competency: defined as a cluster of knowledge, skills, abilities and other characteristics (KSAO) that underlie effective individual behavior leading to organizational or institutional success. There are several definitions in the acronym KSAO that are critical for analysis.

3. Knowledge: familiarity, awareness or understanding gained through experience or study.

4. Skill: an acquired aptitude.

5. Ability: an enduring attribute of an individual's capability for performing a particular range of tasks.

6. Attribute: a characteristic of fundamental property of an individual.

7. Trait: a characteristic (inherited or acquired), which is persistent and stable.

8. Composite: construct that represents more than one KSAO combined and not otherwise characterized as a KSAO.

9. Core competencies: necessary for every position in the organization, and support the organizations mission, vision and values.

10. Enduring competency: behaviors and characteristics pervasive across functions learned throughout a lifetime that can be continually deliberately developed.

11. Organizational leaders: individuals who build on direct leader actions and indirectly influence several hundred to several thousand people through staffs to

help them lead their people and manage their organization's resources. They

influence people by establishing policies and organizational climate, and through

systems integration.

12. Organizational leadership: the process used by an individual to manage the

resources assigned to the organization to accomplish the organizations objectives

through command and staff teams, and subordinate leaders in an environment of

more complexity, more people, greater uncertainty, and a greater number of

unintended consequences. They influence through policymaking, setting

organizational climate and systems perspective.

13. Role: a broad subdivision of one's job composed of a group of tasks that are

somewhat related because of the nature of the work or behavior involved.

14. A Strategic leader is an individual, who not only has organizational

responsibility, but who must also represent his or her organization in the

necessary interaction with the maze of other entities that constitute their

organization's external environment.

QUESTIONS AND INTERVIEW TOPICS

There were three questions on the questionnaire and in the interviews. Both the

questionnaire and interview questions were targeted at the specific participant audience.

The military participants were given questions that solicited their individual expectations

concerning integrating support with interagency partners. The interagency participants

were given questions that solicited their expectations concerning integrating support with

military partners.

The questions relate to identifying competencies and characteristics that are essential to coordinated and effective military / interagency operations in support of military operations. The responses to these questions would be used to identify methods for improving the ways in which military and interagency participants develop these skills and knowledge levels. By improving the skills and knowledge levels of all of the military and interagency participants, the United States can more effectively operate with multi-national partners in future military operations.

For the purpose of this study, an interagency action team is defined as a team involving representatives from two or more United States governmental agencies that will produce a recommendation or a solution to a problem. Performance is defined as improving the speed (timeliness), specificity (exactness), and quality (correctness) of the interagency participation.

QUESTION ONE – INDIVIDUAL TEAM MEMBER CHARACTERISTICS

This question is designed to gauge what the respondents believed would be the requisite and appropriate characteristics of a military service member or interagency organization member that is participating as a member of a military / interagency team. This team would be solving a problem in a combat area while supporting a military operation.

The following background was provided for question one: "You are deployed to a foreign country as a representative of your governmental organization (to include military members representing the Department of Defense). The Department of Defense is the lead agency at this phase of the operation. There are several threats including an insurgency. The local situation requires all organizations to coordinate movement in the

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area. The interagency and non-governmental organizations are protected by use of military forces and civilian contracted forces. Your higher headquarters or organization requires you to integrate your efforts in support of military operations."

QUESTION TWO – PERSONAL SKILL AND KNOWLEDGE IMPROVEMENTS

This question is designed to solicit responses that indicate the knowledge areas and skills that the respondent feels would improve their ability to contribute as a member of a military / interagency action team. This team performance would be focused on solving a problem or making a recommendation while supporting a military operation.

Participants were requested to provide their response based on their personal assessment of their current skills and knowledge levels based on their past experiences in combat. It is assumed that all military participants are competent in the respective skills and have the knowledge level sufficient to meet all military requirements.

As there is currently little formal schooling, institutional developmental opportunities or training available in operational assignments that is focused on improving coordination with interagency partners, we know that military members want additional means to increase their individual capabilities. By identifying the knowledge and skills that are required to meet these expectations, we can identify develop means to improve them.

QUESTION THREE – IMPROVING MILITARY / INTERAGENCY PARTNERS

This question is designed to gauge what the respondents believed would be the requisite and appropriate skills and knowledge areas necessary to better understand and solve a military / interagency problem. This question focuses participants to reflect on their recent combat experience as they develop their response.

PARTICIPANTS

The participants fall into the two categories, military and interagency members. The participants were asked to provide data concerning their background and experience. This data was used to develop comparisons and to analyze the responses.

DEMOGRAPHICS OF MILITARY PARTICIPANTS

BRANCH OF SERVICE

Each military service member was identified by branch of service, military experience, pay grade / rank, combat experience, type of duty, previous interagency experience, and frequency of working with interagency partners. The branch of service is defined as the military participants commissioning or enlistment source and either US Army, US Air Force, US Navy or US Marine Corps. Of the participants, eighty six percent (86%) were U.S. Army soldiers, eight percent (8%) were U.S. Marines, three percent (3%) were U.S. Air Force airmen, and two percent (2%) were U.S. Navy sailors. All of the participants were involved in ground operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

YEARS OF SERVICE IN THE MILITARY

The years of military service can be related to experience. The participants were divided into four groupings based on their total years of military experience; group 1 - five years of military service or less; group 2 - more than five years but less than ten years of service; group 3 - more than ten years but less than fifteen years of service, and group 4 - more than fifteen years of service. These military participants service experience was as follows: twelve with less than five years of service; fourteen with more than five but less than ten years of service; eighteen with more than ten but less than fifteen years of service; and fifteen with more than fifteen years of service

Of the military participants, twenty percent (20%) had less than five years experience. Twenty four percent (24%) had five or more but less than ten years of service. Thirty percent (30%) had ten or more but less than fifteen years of service. Finally, twenty five percent (25%) had more than fifteen years of military service.

PAY GRADE / RANK

The pay grade / rank of participants can be associated with the duties and responsibilities during integrated military / interagency operations. The participants were subdivided into two groupings, a company level group and a battalion and above group. The company level group includes all officers in the pay grade of 0-1 (Army Second Lieutenant) through 0-2 (Army First Lieutenant or Naval Lieutenant Junior Grade) to 0-3 (Army and Air Force Captain) and non-commissioned officers in the pay grade of E-7 (Army Sergeant First Class) or E-8 (First Sergeant). There were twelve participants from the company level group. The military participants fulfilled duty positions at the platoon (3), company (7), battalion (15), brigade and multi-national brigade (16), multi-national division and division (16), combined joint task force level (4).

The battalion and above group includes all officers in the pay grade of 0-4 (Army Major), through 0-5 (Army and Air Force Lieutenant Colonel) to 0-6 (Colonel) and non-commissioned officers in the pay grade of E-8 (Army Master Sergeant) to E-9 (Army Sergeant Major or Command Sergeant Major). There were forty seven participants from the battalion and above group.

COMBAT EXPERIENCE

The combat experience is defined as the number of months that the service members have been deployed in a combat zone (including combat operations in service members past).

The combat experience allowed grouping into four groups. Group one is service member with less than three months of combat experience, group two is service members with three months but less than six months of combat experience, group three participants had more than six months but less than nine months of combat experience, and group four is more than nine months of combat experience. All of the participants had more than a year of combat experience.

DUTY POSITIONS IN COMBAT

All of the participants in this study were required to have served in combat in Iraq or Afghanistan. Of the combat experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, seven percent (7%) of the participants served in duty positions at the platoon level, twelve percent (12%) of the company level, twenty five percent (25%) at the battalion level, twenty seven percent (27%) at the brigade level, twenty seven percent (27%) at the division level, and six percent (6%) at the combined joint task force level.

The military participants had combat experience with several units (Combined Joint Task Force 7 (one participant), Multinational Division North (one participant), Multinational Brigade North (one participant), Task Force Olympia (one participant), Special Operations Task Force 626 (one participant), Special Operations Task Force 126 (one participant), 5th Special Forces Group (two participants), 10th Special Forces Group (two participants), 4th Naval Special Warfare Group (one participant), 10th Mountain Division (three participants), 82nd Airborne Division (three participants), 173rd Airborne

Infantry Brigade Combat Team (four participants), 3rd Infantry Regiment (four participants), 4th Infantry Division (four participants), 1st Infantry Division (four participants), 25th Infantry Division (four participants); 2nd Infantry Division (six participants), 101st Airborne (Air Assault) (four participants), 1st Cavalry Division (three participants), 1st Armored Division (three participants), US Marine Corps (five participants), US Air Force (three participants). This information divided by type of unit, echelon, and service organization and presented in Figure 3.

COMBINED HEADQUARTERS

1	1	1	1
Combined Joint Task Force Seven	Multi-National Division North	I Corps Multi-National Brigade North	Task Force Olympia Multi-national Brigade North

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCE HEADQUARTERS

1	1	2	2	1
Joint Special Operations Task Force 121	Joint Special Operations Task Force 626	5th Special Forces Group	10th Special Forces Group	US Navy Sea-Air-Land Team Special Warfare Gp

ARMY DIVISION HEADQUARTERS

4	3	3	6	4
1st Infantry Division	1st Cavalry Division	1st Armored Division	2nd Infantry Division	3rd Infantry Division
3	3	4	4	3
4th Infantry Division	10th Mountain Division	25th Infantry Division	101st Air Assault Division	82nd Airborne Division

SEPARATE INFANTRY BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS   **SISTER SERVICE PARTICIPANTS**

4		3	5
173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team		US Air Force	US Marine Corps

Figure 1. Chart presenting military units (name in box) that study participants (number on top of box) were assigned to during most recent combat experience

The time in combat zone was two individuals or three percent (3%) of military participants had less than 3 months or less experience in combat. Six participants or ten percent (10%) had more than three months and less than six months of combat experience. Nine service members or fifteen percent (15%) had more than six months

and less than nine months of experience in combat. Finally, thirty two participants, or

fifty four percent (54%) had over nine months in combat.

TYPE OF DUTY

The type of duty is defined as the type of primary duty that the service member is

responsible for executing. The duty is divided into three groupings, group one is staff

officer or non-commissioned officer (all grades and ranks) serving in staff positions.

Group two includes military personnel that are not in command but are in leadership

positions (officers and non-commissioned officers), and group three is all commanders

(Army Captains, Lieutenant Colonels, and Colonels). There were nineteen, or thirty two

percent (32%) of the military respondents that served in staff positions. There were

sixteen, or twenty seven percent (27%) of participants that were in leadership positions

but not commanders. This group included non-commissioned officers (minus Command

Sergeants Majors), platoon and Special Forces team leaders. The final group,

Commanders consisted of twenty four respondents. This group was the majority of the

participants with forty one percent (41%) representation.

The military participants fulfilled duty positions at the platoon (4), company (6),

battalion (8), brigade or multi-national brigade (16), multi-national division / infantry

division / cavalry division or armor division (16), special operations group or task force

(8), and combined joint task force level (2).

EXPERIENCE IN DEALING WITH INTERAGENCY

Previous interagency experience is defined as any previous experience of working

with the any U.S. governmental organization or agency during a contingency or combat

operation. The experience in working with interagency members in the past was thirty

eight, or sixty four percent (64%) had experience in working with interagency partners while twenty one or thirty six percent had no experience. This prior experience impacted how the respondents assessed and represented interagency personnel.

It is possible that initial impressions and preconceived notions by military respondents concerning certain interagency individuals, Central Intelligence Agency operators or USAID coordinators, impacted expectations and therefore military responses.

FREQUENCY OF INTEGRATION

The frequency (number of times) that military participants worked with interagency personnel per month was the means of measure.   There were twelve military participants or twenty percent (20%) that reported personal contact with interagency members less than six days per month; nine military participants or fifteen percent (15%) had experienced contact with interagency members more than six times but less than thirteen times per month. Eight military participants, fourteen percent (14%) had more than fourteen yet less than twenty interagency contacts per month. Thirty military or fifty one percent (51%) of participants had over twenty contacts with interagency partners per month.   The average participant had twenty contacts with interagency members per month.

RANK STRUCTURE

Military participants were divided into two groups, group one was comprised of company grade officers (lieutenants and captains) and non-commissioned officers (sergeants first class and first sergeants) serving in company or below organizations. Group two was comprised of officers (majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels) and non-

commissioned officers (master sergeants, sergeant's major, and command sergeants major) at the battalion and above level. There were eight (8) company grade participants and fifty one (51) at the battalion and above level.

DEMOGRAPHICS OF INTERAGENCY PARTICIPANTS

The thirty (30) interagency representatives were from ten governmental departments, agencies, or bureaus. The Department of Defense [Defense Human Intelligence Service (DHS)] had two participants or six percent (6%), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) had two participants or six percent (6%), and Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) had two participants or six percent (6%) of the interagency groups] had six or twenty percent (20%) of the interagency participants.

The National Security Agency had three or ten percent (10%) of the interagency participants.

The Central Intelligence Agency had four or thirteen percent (13%) of the interagency participants.

The Department of State had four or thirteen percent (13%) of the interagency participants. The United States Agency for International Development had six or twenty percent (20%) of the interagency participants.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had five or seventeen percent (17%) of the interagency participants.

The Department of Agriculture and United States Customs Agency both had a single participant or three percent (3%) of the interagency participants respectively.

DUTY POSITIONS

The Interagency participants were grouped into intelligence (eleven participants or 37%), diplomatic and international support (twelve participants or 40%), and security support functions (seven participants or 23%) for comparison. Nineteen or sixty three (63%) of the interagency participants fulfilled duty positions at the district (at the province or city) level. Eight or twenty six percent (26%) served at the country level, all of this refers to most recent service in either Iraq or Afghanistan. Finally, three or ten percent (10%) of the interagency participants served at the regional level.

PREVIOUS EXPERINCE WORKING WITH MILITARY

Eighteen interagency participants, sixty percent (60%) had worked with the military in the past and twelve or forty percent had no experience in working with the military prior to their service in Afghanistan and / or Iraq in support of Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation Iraqi Freedom respectively.

FORWARD DEPLOYED EXPERIENCE IN COMBAT ZONE

Several of the interagency team members had served for extended periods of time in combat zones. Every one of the interagency participants had experienced conducting operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. The time in combat zone differed amongst the participants.

The time in combat zone was described as time in a country while the United States military was involved in combat operations in that country. Five interagency participants or sixteen percent (16%) had zero three months of experience serving in a combat zone. Eleven or thirty six percent (36%) had more than three months but less than six months serving in a combat zone. Six or twenty percent (20%) had six or more months but less than nine months serving in a combat zone. Nine interagency

participants or thirty percent (30%) had more than nine months service serving in a combat zone.

MONTHLY FREQUENCY OF WORKING WITH THE MILITARY

Participants were asked to provide the frequency with which they coordinated with the military within a month long period. This was further defined as the frequency, or number of times, that the interagency participants had worked with military members during combat operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. One Hundred percent (100%) of the participants had more than six days per month of working with their military partners. Three (3) participants or ten percent (10%) worked more than seven (7) but less than thirteen (13) days per month with the military. Nine (9) or thirty percent (30%) of the interagency participants had more than fourteen (14) but less than twenty dealings with the military per month. Eighteen (18) or sixty percent (60%) of the participants worked with the military twenty (20) or more days per month in working with the military.

RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE

It is critical to understand that responses to the questionnaire and interview are based on the individual participant's recollection, assessment, analysis (to determine how their experiences related to the question) and response.

In several instances, responses generated written or verbal explanations to expound on or explain the response. In some cases, the explanation included developing and providing a recommendation. The following information comprises the results from the questionnaire and interview responses. The data was not compared until all of the responses were received and the results could be analyzed. Based on the results, analysis,

comparison, and summaries will be produced and presented later in this thesis. The results and responses from the questionnaire and interviews are as follows:

MILITARY RESPONSES TO QUESTION ONE

"What are the top three individual characteristics that Interagency Team Members must be competent in to produce quality results in solving a complex problem in a foreign country?"

TOP CHARACTERISTIC REQUIRING COMPETENCY

The largest response by military participants was that interagency partners must be broad-minded and knowledgeable in military planning processes and operations to have the capacity to assist in solving problems.

Several times, the military respondents were disappointed that interagency participants did not provide assistance outside of their specialty, especially when the military knew that the interagency partner had previous experience in this area.

During the interview process, the military respondents further explained that they had observed interagency partner's, that were participating in supporting military operations, only focusing on their agenda and therefore did not analyze the entire situation, especially the threat, when developing their supporting plans.

A clear majority of the forty nine military participants provided this characteristic as one of their top three responses. Forty nine (49) or eighty three percent (83%) of the participants responded that interagency team members must be more knowledgeable of military operations.

2nd CHARACTERISTIC REQUIRING COMPETENCY

The second largest response to question one by military participants was that interagency partners must be able to provide clear, concise, and accurate information to support the military operation. Thirty six (36) or sixty one percent (61%) of the responses indicated that the interagency participants must be able to provide clear, concise and accurate information when queried by military leaders.

This response was further clarified during the interview process. The military assesses that the interagency partners provide unrelated or unimportant information when queried by military Commanders and staffs. Additionally, the military participants determined that the interagency partners had difficulty in providing a clear and concise response. Several examples were provided that demonstrate interagency partners providing analysis and opinion to there military counterparts when facts were required.

3rd CHARACTERISTIC REQUIRING COMPETENCY

Finally, there were some allegations that interagency partners did not provide honest opinions or facts and instead stated that they could not provide responses due to having to clear their recommendation with their higher headquarters. This presented an understanding that interagency partners were more loyal to their organization than to accomplishing the assigned mission. The military participants also alleged that interagency partners at times provided the responses that the military leaders wanted to hear and not necessarily the most accurate information.

The third largest response to question one by military participants was that the interagency partners must be hardworking professionals. This response was provided twenty eight times by military participants. Twenty eight (28) or forty seven percent

(47%) of the military respondents recommended that interagency partners must be harder working.

This response was clarified by interview participants that explained that there were several occasions when staff sessions, decision briefings, or critical actions were not attended by interagency partners. As some of these were after normal daylight hours, but there were several examples of this occurring during the day when the lead interagency representative was unavailable or conducting other business that they deemed more important.

There were one hundred seventy seven military responses to this first question.

OTHER COMPETENCIES

Of the one hundred seventy seven (177) responses, one hundred thirteen (113) or sixty four percent of the responses verified the top three responses.

From these responses, twenty three additional characteristics were determined to answer this first question. The next three most provided responses are as follows, in priority:

4.) Obedience or unity to the Command

5.) Knowledge of military systems and functions (to enable organization to function)

6.) Increased knowledge concerning the current situation (culture, environment, host nation civilians, local practices)

MILITARY RESPONSES TO QUESTION TWO

"As a member of a Military / Interagency Action Team, our team performance could be improved if I personally had more knowledge concerning (A.)_____ and better (B.) _____ skills with which to perform my designated tasks."

TOP AREA FOR PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT

The largest response to the military knowledge requirement (answer A) to this question was that individual military participants desired to have a better understanding of interagency partners and their associated organizations purpose and objectives. Military participants explained that they were not provided with any classes on interagency organizations or official representatives from those organizations during any of the professional development courses that they had attended in their careers. There were thirty three responses from military participants that provided this as a knowledge requirement. Thirty three (33) responses or fifty six percent (56%) of the military responses to question two indicated that there was a desire to have a better knowledge of interagency organizations, objectives and operating procedures.

TOP AREA FOR PERSONAL SKILL DEVELOPMENT

The largest response concerning identification of the top skill required (answer to question II B), to interact as a member of the military / interagency team, was to be skilled in communicating and possess communications skills. Military participants believed that communicating information and ideas with interagency partners during staffing procedures, decision and information briefings required additional development.

This skill was also required when dealing with host nation leaders. Communications was often referred to as critical to military / interagency integration. The communication skills were associated with thirty military responses. Thirty (30)

military respondents or fifty percent (50%) of the responses recommended that they personally desire to have better communication skills. This skill would directly lead to improving their ability to contribute to a military / interagency team.

2nd AREA FOR PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT

The military response to the A portion of question number two was stability operations. Stability operations are the area in which the second largest number of military participant's desired to increase their knowledge level. Several of the military participants identified transition operations from decisive combat into stability operations, or phase IV operations as a knowledge shortfall.

The military in both Iraq and Afghanistan initially had challenges with transitioning from decisive military operations, a uniquely military led portion of the operation, to stability operations, where the military shares responsibility with interagency partners. This response was confirmed during the interviews with military personnel. There were nineteen responses or thirty two percent (32%) that identified knowledge of stability operations as an area for improvement and essential to military and interagency team operations.   These responses indicated that military personnel desired to personally have a better knowledge of stability operations.

2nd AREA FOR PERSONAL SKILL DEVELOPMENT

The second most desired skill was the ability of leaders to determine what was important. The skill was further explained as the ability to absorb multiple types of information from numerous sources and determine the important, critical or decisive pieces. This skill will allow military leaders to identify military and interagency seams and apply the proper resources or solutions to correct the problem.

The desire to be able to receive lots of information and determine the important portions was identified as a knowledge competency as well as a skill. For this study, it was determined that it was more of a skill than a knowledge level. There were seventeen responses that sought this skill as an area of improvement. Seventeen (17) or twenty eight percent (28%) of the military respondents recommended that they develop better individual skills in determining what was important. This was deemed especially important to military members of future military / interagency teams. This skill would assist in the team's efforts to support military operations.

3rd AREA FOR PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT

The third most popular military response to the A portion (knowledge level) of question number two was technical knowledge. Military participants believed that they would benefit from having a higher level of technical expertise. Technical knowledge was deemed essential to military and interagency success.

When the military is the lead agency in an operation, and Commander must make informed decisions, the commander, subordinate leaders and the supporting staffs must have the technical expertise to make decisions and provide recommendations for decision making. There were six (6) responses or ten percent (10%) of the total military responses to question two recommended that military members acquire a higher understanding of technical knowledge.

The technical knowledge required is that deemed essential to make informed recommendations for command decisions in military / interagency operations.

3rd AREA FOR PERSONAL SKILL DEVELOPMENT

The skill that received the third highest response rate was maturity and/or patience. Maturity was the third top military response to the B portion (skills) of question number two. The military participants believed that increasing their level of maturity and patience in conducting military and interagency operations. The military participants believed that in their recent experiences in Afghanistan or Iraq that they did not demonstrate maturity and/or patience when dealing with organizations outside of the military.

The organizations they described were not necessarily interagency partners, but often were non-governmental organizations, host nation contracted persons or others. In interviews, the military participants believed that much of this frustration was due to procedures (or lack of procedures) and practices that are different from those used by the military.

It was also highlighted that interagency partners often did not conduct deliberate planning or contingency planning and often only responded in a crisis situation. The level of stress increases in crisis and more maturity and patience is a probable solution.

There were eight responses that highlighted maturity and patience as essential to military / interagency success. Eight (8) or fourteen percent (14%) of the military respondents indicated that they would need more patience skills or maturity when participating as a member of a military / interagency team in the future.

MILITARY RESPONSES TO QUESTION THREE

"*Based on my combat experience and from operating with military partners in support of past military / interagency operations, I believe that the military needs to improve their*

knowledge of (G.)_____ and (H.)_____ skills to

conduct better and more integrated joint military / interagency operations."

The largest response to question three by military participants was that the

military needs to improve their knowledge of their interagency partner's capabilities and

challenges. The military participants believed that interagency partners would provide

support in several areas that the interagency could not. The military members had

expectations that were not realistic when dealing with interagency partners. One military

brigade level operations officer expected the Department of State to provide liaisons

down to the Battalion level. Another operations officer expected USAID representatives

to have trucks laden with relief and reconstruction supplies to show up almost

simultaneously. There were forty nine responses from military participants concerning

this knowledge area.

The skill that the military participants determined they must improve to become a

better joint military/interagency team was the skill of being a full-spectrum warrior. The

military believed that there was a clear delineation between missions that the military

should be involved in (mostly combat) and missions that the military should support

another agency or organization leading (stability and support operations).

The military participants nearly all believed that the military overextended itself

in Iraq and Afghanistan. An overwhelming majority felt that by demonstrating their

prowess as war fighters that the burden of stability operations would be eased.

Additionally, most of the military members believed that senior Department of Defense

and uniformed military leaders had volunteered to provide military support of the current

ongoing stability operations.

The second largest response, by military participants, to question three, was increasing knowledge of the interagency systems, practices, techniques, and procedures. The military participants believed that they were unaware of how the interagency represented in Afghanistan and Iraq planned and operated. Numerous military participants stated that the interagency partners and governmental agencies they represented didn't have existing procedures or practices for operating in stability operations. Many also stated that interagency partners were not quick to adopt the military techniques and procedures, when doing so would have proved useful. There were nine responses that identified interagency systems and practices knowledge as important to the future of military and interagency cooperation.

The second largest skill that military participants believed their organization should work on was the skills required to integrate with members of the interagency. The military participants further explained that integrating skills should be a focus for institutional development. Several of the military participants believed that these skills are currently required for joint integration and will grow in importance as the military increasingly integrates with interagency elements. The military participants believed that these integration skills would also be required in dealing with host nation forces, governments, international and U.S. non-governmental organizations. There were twenty nine responses that identified integrating skills as essential to improving future military and interagency operations.

The third largest knowledge area identified was threat and environmental information. The military participants believed that by having an increased level of

knowledge concerning the threat and environment that military and interagency integration would be improved.

Most of the military participants were concerned with the interagency having different and in some cases better, information than the military forces did in Iraq and Afghanistan. Several of the military participants expressed concern about the interagency partners using different information systems and databases than the military. There were twenty one responses that highlighted this requirement for future emphasis.

The third largest skill response was that military must improve their leadership skills to better integrate military and interagency partners. Leading complex organizations, especially where no unity of command exists, will require Commanders and their staffs to have much broader leader skills. The interviews provided additional insights concerning the requirement for these leader skills.

Military participants cited leaders having difficulty with integrating "outsiders", or outside organizations, into their command posts. Clearance for access, compatibility of information systems, and fewer interagency representatives provide leader challenges.

Leaders must employ different leadership techniques when dealing with the different players in a military / interagency support operation. There were nineteen responses that identified leadership skills as a future development focus.

INTERAGENCY RESPONSES TO QUESTION ONE

"*What are the top three individual characteristics that Military Team Members must be competent in to produce quality results in solving a complex problem in a foreign country?" ANSWERS WERE ASSESSED INDIVIDUALLY.*

The largest interagency response was that military participants must have a better knowledge of the environment. Interagency partners believed that the military understood their requirements, capabilities, and the threat, but often did not understand the culture and host nation people's desires. The interagency participants indicated that military responses initiated without considering the environment were sometimes problematic. Several examples of military actions worsening the situation were founded on a lack of understanding of the environment. There were twenty responses that indicated that the military needed to develop a better knowledge of their environment to improve their ability to operate as a partner in the military and interagency team.

The knowledge area that received the second largest number of responses to was information about interagency capabilities. The military does not expend a lot of resources (time, money, etc.) in developing leaders to understand interagency organizations. The ability to operate effectively with interagency partners requires that military persons have an understanding of the capabilities and limitations of their partners. Interagency participants provided insights stating that several of the problems that they experienced in Afghanistan and Iraq were due to this knowledge deficiency. Interagency partners stated that several hours were expended informing military partners of their basic organization, members, objectives, plans, systems, facility requirements, and functions. There were seventeen interagency responses concerning interagency capabilities.

The third largest response concerned phase IV or stability operations. The interagency participants believed that the military must develop a better foundation of knowledge concerning stability operations. All of the interagency participants lauded the

military knowledge of war fighting and combat in general. Nearly all of the participants were concerned that the military did not have the requisite tactics, techniques and procedures necessary to accomplish stability operations. There were sixteen responses that highlighted stability operations knowledge as critical to future military and interagency operations.

INTERAGENCY RESPONSES TO QUESTION TWO

"As a member of an Military / Interagency Action Team, our team performance could be improved if I personally had more knowledge concerning (C.) _____and better (D.)_____ skills with which to perform my designated tasks."

The largest response that was given to question two stated that interagency participants needed more knowledge (C response) concerning military operations and military capabilities. The interagency participants believed that the military had several very good systems, practices, techniques, procedures and processes that were very good, especially in military / interagency operations.

The interagency participants acknowledged not having a deliberate planning capability and were more comfortable in handling each situation or crisis differently. A large number of interagency participants believed that an interagency process should be developed for use in stability operations. There were seventeen responses that provided this area, knowledge of military operations, as a problem area.

The skills (D. response) that interagency participants believed that they would benefit from improving are communication skills. The participants believed that communicating challenges led to several of the problems between interagency participants and the military. The interagency participants indicated that organizational

language, acronyms, decision making information requirements, expectations of both military and interagency leaders, contributed to communication challenges. Verbal communications was not the only area that challenges were noted. Incompatible radio and telephone systems and information systems led to communications problems. There were fourteen responses that highlighted this area for future development.

The interagency participants believed that improving personal knowledge of the threat and the environment was needed to operate in future military and interagency operations. The interagency participants explained that although they were provided with information concerning the threat and the environment, they were not prepared to operate under these conditions. The interagency participants expressed concerns that they did not have the detailed, specific information of their regional or city that they operated in. These same interagency participants believed that sharing information before deploying; including passage of military insights to interagency partners would be beneficial. There were twenty-five participants that identified this knowledge as important to future military and interagency operations.

Planning and coordinating skills received the next higher response for individual interagency participant improvement. The interagency participants that were interviewed believed that they needed a planning capability that resembled the military's. The ability to nest plans and operations to national and regional objectives were highlighted as essential. There were nineteen interagency participants that illuminated these skills as necessary in future military and interagency operations.

Conceptual knowledge was the area that individual interagency participants deemed to be important to future military and interagency operations. The ability to

conceptualize solutions and to understand complex concepts was important to fifteen interagency participants. Conceptualization and developing initiatives were not things that interagency participants indicated were built in their previous experiences.

The second skill that interagency participants recognized as important to future military / interagency success was leadership skills. The interagency participants expressed concerns with the fact that their organizations placed more value on managerial competency than leadership skills. A majority of the interagency persons stated that based on their experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, that there were several occasions that leadership skills were required. This was noted to be especially important because during transitions from military to host nation or transition from military to interagency lead there was sometimes a void allowing future problems. Eleven (11) interagency participants highlighted this as essential to future military / interagency operations.

INTERAGENCY RESPONSES TO QUESTION THREE

"*Based on my combat experience and from operating with military partners in support of past military / interagency operations, I believe that the military needs to improve their knowledge of (G.)_____ and (H.)_____ skills to conduct more integrated joint military / interagency operations.*

Interagency participants believed that the military needs to improve their knowledge of interagency capabilities, practices, and procedures. The interagency assessed the military to be largely unprepared and often unwilling to integrate interagency requirements into their plans. There were also several interviewed interagency participants that expressed concern with the military's desire to hand off challenges to the interagency rather than resolve them. This was often compounded by

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the vast disparity of the number of military in the area and the number of interagency participants. With having only a few interagency representatives, it was nearly impossible to plan, coordinate, and supervise interagency operations. There were twenty eight responses that identified this knowledge area for improvement.

The skill that interagency partners determined that the military needed to improve was patience. The interagency participants were concerned with the military leader's patience, or lack there of, when dealing with the interagency team. The military was often impatient with interagency actions, priorities, and approaches. The interagency partners expressed frustration with military staffs and commanders desiring immediate results. There were twenty one interagency responses that identified patience as a skill that the military should further develop.

The second largest response to question three was interagency participants believed that military members needed to improve was their knowledge of the environment. The interagency participants believed that the military has superb knowledge of the threat and the battlespace, but knowledge of the inhabitants, local society, and detailed specifics were unknown. The interagency partners based this observation on experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. The observation was supported with examples, such as military's lack of understanding of tribal linkages, customary codes of honor and respect, and important roles of elders and women. The interagency participants believed that the military did not include these considerations in their planning. There were twenty one responses that highlighted this knowledge requirement.

The largest response to question three was skill in team building. The interagency believed that the military had fantastic internal teaming but was challenged with

expanding to include outside organizations. The pressures of the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq often did not allow a long period of time in which to develop teamwork between military and interagency partners. The interagency was often following the military that had preceded their arrival in the area. The interagency representatives interviewed provided several examples of teamwork challenges including not being invited to information and decision briefs and not being provided with full information (often citing classification reasons), and sessions .   There were seventeen responses that identified this competency.

The third knowledge area that was identified for the military to improve was technical knowledge. The interagency participants provided concern that the military organizations that they worked with in combat areas did not understand the basic technical knowledge of how governmental organizations work, how facilities were constructed, how services (water, electricity, sewage) work, and other areas. These areas were deemed as essential to conducting post-conflict operations. There were thirteen interagency participants that identified technical knowledge requirement as essential to future military / interagency operations.

The skill that was identified as the third area for the military to improve is the knowledge area that military personnel must improve for future military and interagency operations are communications skills. Interagency participants believed that the military could enhance their future military and interagency operations by improving the verbal, data, and radio-telephone communications. These skills are essential to integrating military / interagency operations and for successful synchronization of all missions.

SUMMARY OF RESPONSES

The responses to the questionnaire were broad and in several cases unique. The military and interagency participants shared views and recommended corrective actions to be taken. Below is a chart (Figure 1) that details the military responses. The interagency response summary is in the chart (Figure 2) below the military summary.

MILITARY RESPONSE SUMMARY

The military responded that the interagency partners need a better understanding of how the military plans and conducts operations. The military responses indicate that there are communication challenges between military and interagency due to using different briefing techniques and difference in ways that decision makers are provided with information prior to decision. Finally, the interagency representatives that are deployed need to understand that the individual military members will expend 20 hours per day to accomplish their assigned task and the interagency partners should consider their work ethic.

The military also provided some internal criticism. Military members recommended that they are provided a better foundation concerning interagency capabilities, systems, practices, techniques and procedures. This interagency development must include detailed technical data and access to potential solutions.

The military also recognized the need to study stability and support operations. The military must develop skills in integrating and leading complex organizations (including interagency, multi-national, international agencies, and non-governmental organization members). Other skills that the military must work on include patience with outside agencies, communication skills, and identifying the critical and decisive information in interagency operations.

SUMMARY OF MILITARY PARTICIPANT RESPONSES
TO QUESTIONNAIRES AND INTERVIEWS
FOR THESIS

QUESTIONS	Largest Response	2nd Largest Response	3rd Largest Response
Question 1	Interagency needs to know how to military plans	Interagency needs to provide clear, concise info	Interagency needs to be hardworking professionals
Question 2A	Military needs better understanding of Interagency ops	Military needs better understanding of stability operations	Military needs better technical knowledge
Question 2B	Military needs to be better at communicating	Military needs to be better at identifying decisive / critical info	Military needs to be more patient with inter-agency organizations
Question 3C	Military needs better understanding of inter-agency cappabilites	Military needs better understanding of inter-agency systems/TTPs	Military needs better knowledge of threat and environment
Question 3D	Military needs more Skills to conduct Full Spectrum operations	Military needs to work on integration skills	Military needs to work on leading complex organizations

Figure 1. Summary of Military Participants Responses

INTERAGENCY SUMMARY

The interagency responses, in many cases, mirrored military responses. The interagency responses believed that the military must develop better understandings of environment (especially stability and support mechanisms), interagency capabilities and stability operations. The interagency believed that the military must be exposed to how the various interagency organizations work, to posture them for successful transition. The interagency believed that they needed to improve their understanding of military operations, the threats, factors in the environment, and how to develop concepts. The interagency needs to be better they needed to be better at communicating, at planning, at coordinating, and needed leadership development.

Finally the military needed to work on integration skills and leaders needed to work on their handling of non-military partners. The interagency insights were instrumental at providing an outside view of military operating in a foreign country. The interagency admits that they approach problems in a different manner than the military does. The interagency also expressed concern in the negative ways that they were treated by the military and with the negative perceptions that they felt the military had for them. All of these will be addressed in recommendations.

SUMMARY OF INTERAGENCY PARTICIPANT RESPONSES
TO QUESTIONNAIRES AND INTERVIEWS
FOR THESIS

QUESTIONS	Largest Response	2nd Largest Response	3rd Largest Response
Question 1	Military must have better Understanding of threat and environment	Military needs a better Understanding of inter-agency capabilities	Military needs a better understanding of stability operations
Question 2A	Interagency needs better understanding of military ops	Interagency needs better knowledge of threat / environment	Interagency needs better knowledge of conceptualization
Question 2B	Interagency needs to be better at communicating	Interagency needs to have better planning and coordination skills	Interagency needs better leadership skills
Question 3C	Military needs better understanding of inter-agency cappabilites	Military needs better understanding of inter-agency systems/TTPs	Military needs better knowledge of threat and environment
Question 3D	Military needs more Skills to conduct Full Spectrum ops	Military needs to work on integration skills	Military needs to work on leading complex organizations

Figure 2. Summary of Interagency Participants Responses

CHAPTER III – THE COMPETENCIES REQUIRED TO BUILD THE FUTURE

MILITARY / INTERAGENCY TEAM

COMPETENCIES

There are seven competencies and 25 sub-competencies that are proposed by the Joint Senior Leader Competencies Framework. The seven competencies are technical, influencing, improving, conceptual, personal leadership, interpersonal maturity, and world class war fighter. Of these, all but the world class war fighter could be applied to the operational and strategic level leaders in any of the other United States governmental agencies involved in application of U.S. foreign policy in support of military operations. This review will consider these competencies and provide inter-agency examples of how these competencies are relevant.

TECHNICAL

A technically competent interagency leader must understand their organizations systems and the systems of those United States governmental agencies with which they are currently or possibly could be relating. This corresponds with military responses to questions 2A and 3C. A comprehension of the interdependencies between military and interagency systems, decisions, organizations and the tools that support their management is essential. This understanding is inherent in decision making and problem solving. A thorough understanding of the interdependencies would take years of study and application and should focus on interagency operations, stability / phase IV operations, capabilities, integration, threat, and environment. Interagency perceptions confirm these military responses. From the military perspective, study should focus on military operations, systems, techniques, tactics, and procedures along with threat and environmental information. This was confirmed by military responses and interagency perceptions.

Building a cursory understanding is more probably the level of comprehension required to build synergy between agencies. The various systems of all interagency partners along with related explanations could be presented on an Inter-agency compact disc. This could be easily updated or have access to updates on using the INTERNET. This understanding could be used to present future solutions and alternatives. For example, this comprehension is important in that it could facilitate a Department of State leaders understanding of a coalition military campaign.

This level of understanding would allow any United States agency leader to effectively initiate, resource, and implement their internal programs and achieve their organizational goals. Another important comprehension is the understanding of the interdependency between management systems. Specifically, it is desired for United States agency leaders to have a grasp of the technical systems, decisions, organizations and tools of their organization along with familiarity of the ones of other agencies. From this understanding, leaders can direct and manage those integrated systems and tools and identify which ones cannot. By knowing ones that are not interoperable, alternate solutions can be developed.

A unilateral system may be agreed upon between interagency partners and the best solution selected from which to solve the issue at hand or other problem. It is with from these type of interrelations that synergy evolves. Finally, these tools supporting enterprise support effective and efficient use of resources committed to foreign relations. Successful campaign accomplishment involves integrating the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of power to accomplish the related national objectives. The ability of leaders to integrate the instruments of power toward a shared

visualization of ends, ways and means is a competency that is required at all levels of our government, from national and theater level. The ability to envision a desired end state and then apply resources along an agreed upon progressive path will promote mission accomplishment.

The lead agent, from the Federal Bureau of Investigation whose counter-terrorism focus is common or shared with the in-theater Commander of the Joint Special Operations Task Force Command, will focus collection, allow efficient use of high demand / low density systems, and ultimately lead to successful accomplishment of the mission. By sharing the ends, ways, and means framework and working the along inter-agency lines, the United States governmental leaders will be able to move any situation forward to achieve their goals.

INFLUENCING

The ability of military leaders and leaders in other governmental agencies to influence others is another characteristic fundamental to success. Both military and interagency responses to questions 1, 2B, and 3D confirm this competency. Leaders must be able to communicate, motivate, and direct to influence their subordinates, peers, and higher organizations. By fostering teamwork and collaborating, inter-agency leaders can facilitate decision making and problem solving initiatives. These interrelationships that prompt solutions are built on teaming, decentralized execution, empowering others, and building trust and confidence. This trust and confidence is not evident at the cabinet level but it is required to influence many of the situations that arise in instituting foreign policy and complex international relations. By creating an inter-agency climate of openness and trust and by empowering leaders from other agencies involved in the crisis, solutions can

be developed and human capital investment solutions can be maximized. Military responses emphasize communication, work ethic and identification of the decisive / critical information as focus areas for improvement. Interagency responses confirmed the military responses. Interagency responses also recognized the requirement for additional leadership development.

All United States agencies use different decision making techniques to analyze situations, develop alternatives, and promote decisions. The military often has lead in a crisis situation, so the use of the military decision making process is already the norm in a theater. This does not mean that this process is the best alternative. By collaborating in planning and problem solving, the various United States agencies can build a consensus or at least minimize the differences between problem solving methodologies. It is often imperative to identify a lead agency to synchronize efforts of all supporting organizations.

It is also necessary to have this single agency identified as solely responsible to make timely decisions or critical ones when incomplete supporting information is all that is available. An example of this is the directing of United States government human intelligence collectors; from the Departments of Defense, Department of Justice (Federal Bureau of Investigation); with the international agents employed through the Central Intelligence Agency. The Joint Inter-Agency Coordination Group would lead this targeting effort and manage the employment in accordance with capabilities to achieve the desired effect. By managing risk, adapting command and control methods, and integrating procedures the inter-agency team can solve whatever problem is at hand.

CONCEPTUAL

A cognitive capacity to conceptualize a solution is essential to the United States governmental leader. This ability to analyze a situation and use a systems approach to develop solutions is the cornerstone of being have conceptual competence. Developing creativity through creating ideas, alternatives, new processes and solutions and promoting an environment that rewards creative approaches is critical. Creative reasoning allows leaders to identify new direction, promotes ingenuity, and constant quest for improving existing processes and systems. This conceptual cognitive capability will allow inter-agency adaptability.

The ability to quickly and accurately assess the regional or international environment will allow the representatives of any of the United States governmental organizations to capitalize on opportunities and develop creative solutions. Whether developing either flexible deterrent options or means to transition stability operations to the host nation, all governmental agents and representatives must be creative. This is true at the strategic and operational levels. As an international effort matures, the lead United States organization may change although the problem solving strategy and related cognitive capacity skills may remain the same. Understanding of the complex environment and inherent problems must be shared among leaders when operating overseas. Responses indicate military must work to improve understanding of interagency operational concepts. The interagency respondents acknowledge needing improvement in conceptualization. This shared understanding when coupled with a systemic approach eases the requirement to formulate solutions and overcome ambiguity, uncertainty, and complexity.

IMPROVING

Leaders that desire and act to improve themselves, their organization or agency, the situation and others involved in resolving the situation are more apt to develop a solution. Life-long learning, team building, and change leaders are essential in all organizations.   One hundred percent (100%) of respondents, both military and interagency, expressed desire to improve themselves and their organizations.

Whether representing the military or another agency, leaders that are capable of developing and instituting their vision are the ones that lead change. This visionary approach when coupled with creative thinking and innovation results in senior leaders never running out of options.

Cognitive flexibility is contagious in organizations and leads to problem solving at the lower levels. Through coaching, teaching and mentoring during peacetime, leaders build team spirit, trust and confidence at all levels, and an organizational pride. This approach improves inter-agency cohesion and problem solving performance while simultaneously prompting a positive, enthusiastic attitude. By combining the desire to improve specific situations with a life-long learning approach, the inter-governmental agency leaders will develop a new improved culture and exceed the current state of capabilities and known level of competencies.

PERSONAL LEADERSHIP

Inter-agency leaders must identify with the values and beliefs that embody the professional ethos of their profession. The self perception or vision that provides the goal or the foundation for this embodiment is repeatedly adjusted based on operational experiences and self assessments. An inter-agency leader that is devoted to developing this ethos will develop self-confidence.   Interagency respondents to question 2B

acknowledged that improving leadership skill was required. The military responses confirmed this with responses to question 1.

By embracing self-development as a tool of the leader development process, the inter-agency leader will increase their professionalism and refine their organizations leadership values. In the military, professionals value honor, integrity, courage, loyalty, duty, respect, excellence, commitment and selfless service. Several of these are and will continue to be valued by leaders from other United States agencies. Several of these values are exhibited by agents and representatives and sworn during governmental oaths of office or detailed in duty descriptions.

Leaders that can self-identify and who possess desire to assist in the development of junior leaders, the agency will ensure that their respective agency can continue to mature. By identifying the values and characteristics that United States governmental organizations desire will ensure that future leaders are produced. Organizations that encourage junior leaders to continue individual development and augment this development with government or civilian institutional developmental opportunities will continue to produce the requisite competencies.

Professional astuteness and the ability to see oneself as a future leader in a profession will ensure progression. This is evidenced by all of the representatives from the Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency that participate in Department of Defense military opportunities. They seldom get any reward other than the satisfaction of successfully improving themselves and their individual professionalism.

INTERPERSONAL MATURITY

A successful leader in any United States government agency must be able to communicate with other governmental agencies and all audiences with whom they are involved in executing their mission. Whether using active listening skills, negotiation techniques, or participating in consensus building, the inter-agency leader must understand operational requirements and all of the environments and situations within which they will operate. The military respondents acknowledged that there was a need to improve patience and maturity when dealing with interagency partners.

Success in internal agency relations as well as those with representatives from other governmental agencies, international and inter-organizational institutions will be formed on the understanding and maturity of those who actively participate in developing solutions. An understanding of the various cultures, beliefs, norms of behavior and traditions of those individuals and collective groups that are involved in interaction is critical to successful communications. These attributes and the contacts that result from sharing ideas and developing a common ground will pave the way to collaborative successes in foreign policy and overseas relations.

The United States Assistance and International Development (USAID) representative that can synchronize assistance operations with host nation leaders, coordinate security and stability efforts with military organizations (United States Department of Defense and other coalition services), enlist support of non-governmental organizations (NGOs)   formations does so based on their interpersonal maturity.

WORLD CLASS WARFIGHTER AND INTERAGENCY ORGANIZATION EXPERT

The leaders in the United States Department of Defense, especially those in the uniformed services realize the importance of being a world class war fighter. The mission of soldiers in the United States Army is to fight and win our nations wars. The other services share this quest for victorious accomplishment of their military mission. All would agree that they need to have leaders that are world class war fighters that can master operational and strategic art. The representatives from other United States governmental organizations that will participate in operations within the United States and while deployed. All of the military and interagency responses to the questions acknowledged that increasing expertise in their respective specialty area was essential to future success.

CHAPTER IV   RECOMMENDATIONS - FUNCTIONAL APPLICATIONS AIMED AT DEVELOPING AND IMPROVING INTERAGENCY COMPETENCIES

DOCTRINAL SOLUTIONS

Doctrine is essential to establishing a common framework to solve problems, a central understanding of terms, and an integrated group of references. It is necessary to develop and publish a National Security Council (NSC) and Interagency Board approved Inter-Agency Operations Handbook, an information booklet that outlines the various agency problem-solving and decision-making processes. This booklet should provide doctrinal foundation for military and interagency doctrine concerning interagency support of military operations.

Ensure that all Department of Defense leader development opportunities, including military career courses, intermediate level educational opportunities, command

and staff colleges and senior service colleges, include instruction and practical applications from the Inter-Agency Operations Handbook and the doctrine that develops from its use. Ensure Joint Doctrinal Publications are nested with the Inter-agency Operations Handbook.

Include interagency reporting and staffing procedures in military and interagency staff agencies. Standardized informational inputs / outputs and integration of required sequential products will provide a framework for better communication.

ORGANIZATIONAL SOLUTIONS

Organizations provide the foundation of our government. The Departments and agencies that operate worldwide must be integrated to succeed in the future joint operational environments. Initiatives such as the Standing Joint Force Headquarters and the Joint Interagency Coordination Group at the Combatant Commands and interagency working groups at tactical level will foster better accomplishment. By developing habitual relationships in peacetime, the military and interagency will be able to accomplish missions more effectively in combat. Linking uniformed military experts with interagency experts at COCOM and CJTF levels is essential. Developing interagency organizations that are capable of deploying as a rapid crisis response and augmenting standing joint task forces is required.

TRAINING SOLUTIONS

To build and reinforce the skills and knowledge that are developed between the military and interagency partners, a training plan must be developed. The military expends huge amounts of resources to train our current military forces. Training doctrine, training resources, training support programs (ranges, training aids, and training

ammunition) and training centers have enabled military forces to deploy ready to fight and win. These training opportunities must be expanded to include interagency partners. This is occurring at the operational and joint task force level.

Lessons learned from past exercises allowed inter-agency and special operations forces (SOF) leaders to adjust tactics, techniques and procedures for implementation in combat. Military schools should invite interagency participation and develop new integration techniques based on those used at the Joint Special Operations University.

The military adage, "You need to train the way you will fight", applies to Inter-Agency interactions. There are many opportunities to implement some training imperatives such as train the way you will fight. These training opportunities are at the tactical (individual, collective, staff, and joint), operational (service, joint, and inter-agency), and strategic (joint, inter-agency, and national) levels. At all of these levels, we must develop the knowledge foundations and familiarization between the various interagency organizations.

The responses to the questionnaire recommended interagency, foreign host nation government and business practices, and cultural and customs classes be included in military institutions. In interagency developmental forums, include instruction on military organization, military systems, military tactics, techniques, and procedures. Both the military and the interagency must develop standards for communicating ideas, information, decisions, and other areas. We must also develop skills that simplify the inter-reaction between military personnel and inter-agency operators.

Interagency integration during collective training opportunities is available during Combatant Command (COCOM) exercises, Joint National Training Center applications,

and Joint Force Mission Rehearsal Exercises (Operation Unified Endeavor). There have been several thousand individual augmentation persons trained to date for Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and the 40 other military operations that currently employ Joint Task Forces. This same individual augmentation training approach or opportunity could be used for training interagency leaders and those that will support operations overseas.

At the tactical level, we need to integrate inter-agency coordination tasks for service members, junior leaders, staff members, commanders, and senior leaders. These must focus on establishing individual tasks that establish inter-agency integration skills and coordination procedures. We need to develop methods for synchronizing inter-agency programs and promote development of higher inter-agency knowledge levels. Finally, we need to synchronize inter-agency systems.

Training opportunities would enable the creation of a common language, common systems, common reports, compatible computer / communication equipment, common access to restricted areas, elimination of stove piped information channels and compartmentalization, effective use of bandwidth, improved compatibility (internet links, databases), synchronized analysis and assessment, planning procedures (Planning SOP, Decision making processes, crisis and deliberate actions), and coordinating preparations (Brief backs, Liaison, Rehearsals, etc.). This could be applied to deployment, employment (combat operations – offensive / defensive, transition operations, counter-insurgency operations, stability operations, support operations, emergency actions) and redeployment.

LEADER DEVELOPMENT

Leader development is the most important functional category in building an integrated military and interagency team. The survey responses highlighted the importance of leader development. Leaders must have the proper skills and knowledge to fulfill their individual responsibilities. This development will continue for the operation that they will be involved in and for the rest of their respective career.

A part of leader development is education. There are many opportunities that can be leveraged to educate interagency and military leaders. There are several military and civilian institutions that will play an integral part in this education. The military offers joint educational opportunities, service-centric educational opportunities, and military fellowships. The civilian educational opportunities include interagency educational opportunities and advanced degree programs. The military would benefit from developing an integrated military and interagency course.

By prioritizing operational assignments / experience with interagency organizations, the military will develop a bench of leaders that can facilitate integration. Commanders must be developed to integrate and lead organizations that integrate military and interagency organizations. The military needs to develop a specialized track to develop liaisons. By increasing uniformed military billets in DOD and other interagency organizations, including flag officer billets, would promote a broader understanding of interagency requirements and develop expertise. These critical individuals can resolve challenges and promote integration.

Development of coordinating staffs will also have to occur. The coordinating staffs are developed in branch schools, staff schools, and staff colleges. More interagency instruction and practical exercises that demand integration is required at the

staff schools.   There needs to be instruction to develop interagency subject matter experts. These individuals can integrate the communication skills, common integrating language, and common acronyms to further integration.

COMMUNICATION SOLUTIONS

There are several policies, procedural, and system decisions that must be made to effectively ensure the materials and personnel integrating interagency organizations ensure interoperability and interdependence.   The survey responses illuminated this as the largest shortfall in both the military and interagency perspectives. There needs to be common equipment that is easily grouped into functional areas; communications (radios, telephones, computers), protective (personal identification, individual and marking, self-protection weapons, personal and vehicular armor), transportation (ground, air, sea). These can be provided to interagency partners during rapid deployment operations.

The military computer and communications systems currently employed do not have the capability to meet all of the communications interagency requirements. International mobile telephone, satellite telephone, and local cellular / mobile telephone requirements can be acquired from United States, regional or host nation suppliers. This will minimize the impact on the United States military equipment.

Several computer challenges currently exist that disrupt our inter-agency capability to transmit and receive computerized and data communications. From software inter-operability challenges to instable electrical power generation, our ability to integrate is problematic. The global proliferation of digital, internetted computerized communications systems has raised the information assurance requirements both within the United States and those deployed overseas.

The Department of Defense should take the lead in ensuring that all of the systems used overseas are compatible. They should direct baseline requirements for voice communications and have a "loaner fleet" of radios and cellular phones that can be provided to other United States organizations, coalition forces, and international organizations. These could be provided on a chargeable or no-charge basis. Initial acquisition, maintenance and replacement costs should be programmed into existing military infrastructure. Combatant Commands could have these radios on stand-by ready to issue under contingency operations. Concerning computers, the Department of Defense should provide baseline requirements for all systems that are used in contingency situations.

This baseline should include information assurance requirements, power generation requirements, INTERNET based connectivity requirements (cable, data, and technical support), satellite access, spectrum requirements and maintenance / replacement considerations. The military should include these requirements in command post, nodal planning. Although these initial actions may not meet all of the inter-agency communications challenges, it will provide a foundation for more effective integration between Department of Defense forces and other United States governmental agencies.

PERSONNEL SOLUTIONS

The personnel systems of all of our military services, Department of Defense, and other United States governmental organizations are the critical part of building interoperability and integration. One important position would be as liaison between the services and the other governmental organizations. Those skills, knowledge levels and attributes that the former military service members have could be very useful in this

application. By encouraging inter-governmental transfers, through bonuses and other incentives, the inter-agency partners could further this effort. With a large number of military officers and senior NCOs retiring at the twenty year mark, an opportunity exists to transfer their experience and expertise into an interagency organization.

By pushing inter-agency exchanges, the United States could also assist future operations. Exchanges would be for a year and provide those participating in the program to fill common duty positions within the other organization. There are currently Department of Defense exchange positions within Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Justice (Federal Bureau of Investigation) and the National Security Agency. Expansion of these types of exchanges to other governmental agencies and especially in support of overseas deployments would do much to further our ability to integrate future operations.

The Department of Defense should lead this effort and develop additional exchange positions with the National Security Advisor's Office, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Justice, Department of Commerce, Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies. The Department of Defense has more personnel to contribute to an exchange program than other, smaller United States governmental organizations.

By conducting an interdependence and interoperability study reviewing personnel systems to eliminate redundancy and other areas where the United States government may draw some personnel related efficiency. Administrative, personnel services, and other support requirements could be consolidated under a centralized headquarters to eliminate redundancy. Language skills are critical to overseas programs success, both to

military and other governmental organizations. The military language program provides service members with language that have applicability in other offices. The United States government should have a program that promotes transferring persons with critical language skills to other governmental agencies.

FACILITY SOLUTIONS

When inter-agency personnel are participating in support of military operations in a combat environment, the uniformed service who they are working with should be responsible for the facilities that they require. When a United States governmental organization or agency, other than the Department of Defense, is the lead agency in an overseas operation, the lead agent should be responsible for providing facilities to other participants. Compartmentalization of interagency cells by military staffs is problematic. Although this is often due to security clearance challenges it must be overcome to promote interoperability.

The responsibility is to provide the necessary facilities for providing several facility related functions to all agencies and organizations. Force protection, personal living, office space, and common areas are typical facilities required by United States governmental representatives deployed overseas. The threat in the area that US representatives are operating will be analyzed to determine the force protection requirements associated with protection of facilities and persons.

The Department of Defense needs to provide a standard for personal living facilities and office space for all of the inhabitants on a military facility. This should be calculated to provide the personnel from all of the United States governmental organizations separate and equal space for all organizations. The personal living space may very in

temporary (under canvas tentage), semi-permanent (trailers), and permanent (buildings) conditions. Required office space, meeting space, and command post space should be allocated as necessary for each of the various organizations participating in the operation.

The Inter-agency process currently works only when Principles and Deputy Principles of National Security sessions agree on a solution. As this sometimes takes months or years, there must be an interim solution that can be instituted in the interim. This is possible with a single, approved, listing of procedures used to operate until a presidential directive or other legal document is available. To streamline this procedural process, one necessary to plan, prepare, develop, coordinate, monitor, direct, control and assess interagency actions and activities is necessary.

A United States Government Inter-agency Standard Operating Procedure (USIASOP) would allow subordinate level inter-agency and agency specific leaders (JIASC Director, Secretary, Director, Commander, etc.) to solve problems and implement solutions to complex problems. Exceptions to the USIASOP would be developed and coordinated as agreements (detailed in approved USNSC Memorandums of Agreement, and changes to USIASOP) to assist in recommending interagency solutions to international challenges.

STRATEGIC LEVEL SOLUTIONS

By developing a Department of Defense (recommend the DoD is designated lead as they have the largest manpower, budget, and resources) led but inter-agency integrated system for doctrinal publications, training opportunities, leader development processes, organizational designs, compatible materials and equipments, designated shared personnel, and standardized facilities, the United States will be postured to execute policy

involving any international, national, transnational, regional, cultural or other agency, organization, or group.

Solutions that can be agreed upon outside of the beltway will avoid the politics associated with National Security Council Deputies and Principles sessions. Therefore, a summary of Inter-agency coordination and copies of memorandums of agreement will be sent to the Deputies weekly. An Office of the Vice President Inter-agency Coordination Office (VPICO) could direct and oversee an inter-agency coordination progress and ultimately hand this over to the office of the National Security Advisor for implementation. The VPICO would also oversee an Executive Branch focused transformation (concentrating on international operations) with focus on directing select departments (Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Treasury, Department of Commerce) and organizations (Central Intelligence Agency, USAID, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Management and Budget, etc.).

Departments and Organizations would reorganize internally so that their subordinate offices and directorates regions of responsibility match those that the Department of Defense has designated for Geographic Combatant Commands. This is aimed at easing coordination and facilitating teaming between subject-matter expert in each of the designated organizations (Central Intelligence Agency, Department of State, and the Department of Defense).

CONCLUSION

Admiral Giambastiani, the Commanding General, Joint Forces Command (COMJFCOM) has been elaborative in expressing one of his vision's; a vision aimed a

developing a coherent, integrated, interdependent, collaborative, learning and adaptive organization to meet the future international challenges of the United States. This organization must be flexible enough for world-wide application. This organization must be robust enough to handle either a global or regional contingency operation or both. This organization must be streamlined and tailorable enough to be capable of operating in any environment regardless of limitations or security challenges.

This force will include representatives for all of the uniformed services (United States Army, United States Navy, United States Air Force, United States Marine Corps, and when federalized, the United States Coast Guard), and personnel, teams, offices, and organizations from other United States Governmental agencies (Department of State, Department of Justice, Department of the Treasury, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Commerce, Department of Transportation, Central Intelligence Agency, etc.), Multi-national alliances or coalitions, international organizations (United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, etc.), and other non-governmental organizations (private volunteer organizations, non-governmental groups, international and regional disaster relief and humanitarian assistance organizations, international businesses and national corporate entities) involved in crisis resolution.

If we assume that Admiral Giambastiani has identified the goal or why this organization is necessary (solving the complex problems that develop from future international security and stability challenges), we can then focus on developing the who, what, when, and where solutions. More specifically, by identifying who should be involved in this effort (including from fundamental or base level to most complex largest level) we can direct participation on this team.

By identifying what each organization or person involved with this team should contribute toward accomplishing this goal we can then standardize and roles, responsibilities, and functions. These functions can be developed into systems when we identify when the most efficient and effective time (and / or event) to form this organization, as well as the duration for applicability. Finally, where are the necessary locations for establishing nodes, headquarters, or other structural facilities that permit command, direction, coordination, management, information sharing, integration, and control using communications, computers, and other required materials and equipment.

By identifying who, what, when, where, and why, the United States National and Regional leaders are required, we can then begin to establish the foundation for building a procedural process. By standardizing procedures and gaining a consensus between all United States participants, we will be postured to overcome the increasing complexity of operations with multi-national and coalition partners and in time-sensitive situations.

To complete this transformation, we must develop a unique, cooperative interagency doctrine by identifying common procedures and approaches (i.e. operational language, references, problem-solving format, doctrine).

Develop an inter-agency organizational structure (i.e. highlighting integration points and seam responsibilities and including flexible options) that eases synchronization and facilitates both an integrated approach and separate reporting.

Develop an inter-agency leadership development approach that ensures the skills, knowledge and attributes exist to meet future inter-agency requirements (institutional opportunities, interagency assignments and exchanges, self-development requirements).

Identify shared manpower and material requirements (i.e. minimal and maximum documented manning levels; associated requisite skills, knowledge and attributes; detailed responsibilities and authority; manning options - to include reach back; and budgetary considerations) that provide the necessary human capital for synchronized efforts (including personnel structure, distribution, sustaining requirements, exchanges, manning levels, liaison requirements, headquarters staffing, and nodal manning, promotions, replacement coordination, and transition), requirements for inter-agency shared equipment (equipment descriptions, required authorizations, readiness reporting, replacement requisition, equipment maintenance, equipment disposal, and other necessary actions to ensure safe, secure operations in any overseas environment), departmental-specific equipment (for integrating individuals and organizations on inter-agency coordination staffs and ensuring connectivity to their parent organization). The manning and equipment will ease identification of facility requirements (personal, organizational, common, departmental specific, interagency) for temporary and fixed facility use in the future.

Develop, identify and define requirements and opportunities for integrated inter-agency training to include plans for scheduling announced and unannounced compliance and courtesy certification exercises; by instituting these the requisite level of interoperability and competence can be developed and sustained.

It was the purpose of this study to develop recommendations that can assist in integrating military / interagency operations. This study has provided insights and supporting recommendations based on combat experience and experience operating as members of military / interagency teams.

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